t13d1517h2_8daaf6152771_c92d569f1d01
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1517h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
c92d569f1d01
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 17
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 17
-
signature_algorithms -
supported_groups -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
renegotiation_info -
server_name -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
extended_master_secret -
status_request -
supported_versions -
51764 (0xca34) -
compress_certificate -
ec_point_formats -
session_ticket -
encrypted_client_hello -
key_share -
17613 (0x44cd)
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,13-10-16-45-65281-0-18-23-5-43-51764-27-11-35-65037-51-17613,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 170
- First seen
- 2026-09-03 18:13 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-11 20:08 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 170
The same client, 170 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 170 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 170 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
529272332abf4dcd158d69aa00112dfe0aa3cf591eb495549f9610ea8524cad6d907d46512727ad19be32e44c5b6abb127c652657b2f814078b40e39376693de8f36c2294021734402b7adc4e3c26a477d3db67cbe3247613c742533b570892bd2151d4e90b84ea91edc7d5f052ea3d47507567e30b153741964f9db5a02cea5e460c9fbb9313004488b5bcb00b737d744cce2aada15032ed134268390c628d3ace6ef6d54debde4a6027cc9c1bd2fde09feb31203248544d3959446bb01f37a- … and 158 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36117×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3684×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3665×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3658×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3649×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3642×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3635×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3630×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3628×PromptingBot/1.0.026×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3624×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 OPR/136.0.0.017×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3615×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.366×DuckAssistBot/1.2; (+http://duckduckgo.com/duckassistbot.html)2×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 14_4_1) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/17.4.1 Safari/605.1.152×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.