JA4 t13d1811h1_8ba6ad1e1a27_f92bd59bf23a

t13d1811h1_8ba6ad1e1a27_f92bd59bf23a

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

18

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

h1

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 18

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

Extensions 11

• supported_groups
• key_share
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• signature_algorithms
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• padding
• status_request
• session_ticket
• supported_versions
• ec_point_formats
• server_name

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49191-60-157-49187-49199-49195-52393-49200-53-49161-47-49172-49171-49170,10-51-16-13-45-21-5-35-43-11-0,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-10-12 15:19 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-12 15:19 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/139.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 2×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.