JA4 t13d3710ht_5c443a9f7afe_2c84df4778f7

t13d3710ht_5c443a9f7afe_2c84df4778f7

Presented a User-Agent we cannot attribute to a known client.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

37

Extensions offered

10

ALPN

ht

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 37

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 10

• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share

Named groups 10

• x25519
• secp256r1
• x448
• secp521r1
• secp384r1
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072
• ffdhe4096
• 259 (0x0103)
• 260 (0x0104)

Point formats 3

• uncompressed
• ansiX962_compressed_prime
• ansiX962_compressed_char2

771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49200-49195-49199-52393-52392-159-158-52394-49325-49324-49188-49192-49187-49191-49162-49172-49161-49171-49311-49310-107-103-57-51-157-156-49309-49308-61-60-53-47-255,0-11-10-16-22-23-13-43-45-51,29-23-30-25-24-256-257-258-259-260,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-09-01 22:21 UTC

Last seen

2026-09-01 22:21 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; crawler) 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.