JA4 t13d380900_a22fda9eb1a3_295fbc80e014

t13d380900_a22fda9eb1a3_295fbc80e014

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

38

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d450900_d524c25c267f_295fbc80e014

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 38

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• 163 (0x00a3)
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• 162 (0x00a2)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• 106 (0x006a)
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• 64 (0x0040)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• 56 (0x0038)
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• 50 (0x0032)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• 19 (0x0013)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 9

• server_name
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• signature_algorithms_cert
• extended_master_secret
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share

Named groups 8

• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072
• ffdhe4096
• 259 (0x0103)
• 260 (0x0104)

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-49196-49195-49200-49199-159-163-158-162-49188-49192-49187-49191-107-106-103-64-49162-49172-49161-49171-57-56-51-50-157-156-61-60-53-47-49160-49170-22-19-10-255,0-10-11-13-50-23-43-45-51,23-24-25-256-257-258-259-260,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-09-01 22:27 UTC

Last seen

2026-09-01 22:27 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/76.0.3809.100 Safari/537.36 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.