JA4 t13d391200_1def6453891d_263bcccd7b74

t13d391200_1def6453891d_263bcccd7b74

Presented a User-Agent we cannot attribute to a known client.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

39

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 39

• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• 21 (0x0015)
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
• 9 (0x0009)

Extensions 12

• status_request
• extended_master_secret
• renegotiation_info
• record_size_limit
• supported_groups
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• server_name
• key_share
• ec_point_formats
• padding

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,52393-4866-4865-4867-52392-52394-49195-57-49195-49171-61-47-103-49196-49172-49188-107-51-49162-156-49200-49192-158-53-60-49187-49161-157-159-49199-49191-21-49170-49169-10-5-22-4-9,5-23-65281-28-10-45-13-43-0-51-11-21,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

4

First seen

2026-10-08 10:03 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-08 10:21 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

4

The same client, 4 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 4 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 4 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• ab5359898bc2b41de06ed73cbacce451
• 68092c01c14741a0de4b00f28293941b
• 245e3132135d6c51457724d28d94980f
• dd5b49d64fc7406a6b42b2bd472d25b7

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; ASRbot/1.2; +http://www.activesearchresults.com/help/about.php) 2×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.