t13i100900_61a7ad8aa9b6_36363f539193
Probe (no SNI, no ALPN) — inferred from the JA4 handshake shape.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13i100900
handshake shape, human-readable
61a7ad8aa9b6
truncated hash of the cipher list
36363f539193
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- no server name (IP literal)
- Cipher suites offered
- 10
- Extensions offered
- 9
- ALPN
- none offered
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 10
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 9
-
session_ticket -
supported_versions -
key_share -
extended_master_secret -
ec_point_formats -
status_request -
signature_algorithms -
supported_groups -
psk_key_exchange_modes
Named groups 3
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-49199-52392-255,35-43-51-23-11-5-13-10-45,29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 11
- First seen
- 2026-09-05 17:29 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-05 17:30 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 11
The same client, 11 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 11 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 11 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
f1e3298e4ad4366455fd56ed81dbffeb8a54775b1be5df526176bec6a906fe9f1cd7ef077ae64faaeb90bbd518fddbf721d0f752f6d538e67b4262c3d34836b455ac31f635517b509d31857e7a01b488415efdfc5df4464a373720b99f2546a2123c3a94ef5ac3b341bb51008cf6caab1a1806f0f1354889566efb9c8f6e3ec451e4db5927a1d37cd267856def20f6e5053f6a2c6d496b654fb607da7d6a032b9e6c2feeb1288c9b9c60ba19ac3465c2
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; ArgusScanner/0.1; +http://example/abuse)11×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.