JA4 t13i1516h2_8daaf6152771_9d0d4a7883f6

t13i1516h2_8daaf6152771_9d0d4a7883f6

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

15

Extensions offered

16

ALPN

h2

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 15

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA

Extensions 16

• supported_groups
• key_share
• signature_algorithms
• extended_master_secret
• compress_certificate
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• encrypted_client_hello
• 17613 (0x44cd)
• supported_versions
• status_request
• renegotiation_info
• session_ticket
• ec_point_formats
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,10-51-13-23-27-18-16-45-65037-17613-43-5-65281-35-11-41,4588-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-09-13 21:50 UTC

Last seen

2026-09-13 21:50 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 183a825edfa88023c87a29892ff2eaea
• 54e4b1d2ea495f717704922da7d5d2d3

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.