All checks passing Checked 4 minutes ago: 4 name servers on 8 addresses (IPv4 and IPv6), 5 zones, 5 transports.
The short version
Our zones (fated.org, pqpdf.com, stlweb.dev, pqcrypta.com and philibertsecurity.com) are served by 4 authoritative name servers, each on IPv4 and IPv6. They answer over UDP, TCP, DNS over TLS, DNS over QUIC and DNS over HTTPS, and every encrypted transport negotiates a post-quantum key exchange built on ML-KEM (FIPS 203), with a classical curve beside it where the client offers that hybrid.
The zones are signed by a hidden signer that no resolver can reach, and each public server checks a zone's digest and every signature before it serves a byte of it. The Post-Quantum Web Analyzer, which holds other people's name servers to RFC 9250 and RFC 8484, measures these first; a health check asks every address over every transport every five minutes; and the servers count what they answer. Every figure below comes from one of those three, with its source and time beneath it.
How it fits together
The hidden signer holds each zone and its DNSSEC private keys. It signs every change, adds a digest of the whole zone (ZONEMD, RFC 8976) and tells each public server there is a new version. It appears in no NS record: there is no address a resolver could ask it at, so the keys never sit on a machine that answers the Internet.
The public servers hold only signed copies. Each copy reaches them encrypted and authenticated in both directions, and before serving it each server checks the zone's digest and validates every signature, refusing a zone that fails either. A server can lose nothing the zones depend on: they hold no signing keys, and a copy that fails its checks is never served.
The one change a public server passes on is a certificate challenge. When the proxy on a server answers a DNS challenge (dns-01, or dns-account-01 where the CA offers it), it publishes the TXT record as a DNS UPDATE (RFC 2136) signed with that server's own key (TSIG, RFC 8945). The server accepts only TXT records, only under the challenge names of its own host names, and only with that key; it forwards the update to the signer, which signs the record like any other change. The proxy waits until every name server answers with it, and removes it once the CA has checked it.
In the last seven days the public servers took 105 new versions of the zones and checked every copy they loaded, 120 in all, against its digest and signatures, with none refused.
Source: the servers' own logs, read every five minutes · 11 Nov 2026, 13:07 UTC
Transports
Every address answers the same zones over every transport below. "Service" is the share of the five-minute checks in which at least one name server answered over that transport, which is what a resolver, trying the next server when one is slow, depends on; the times are from every address, asked from outside the servers' own networks.
| Transport | Standard | Port | Key exchange | Service | Median | p95 | Queries, 24 h |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UDP | RFC 1035 | 53/udp | clear text | 100% | 1.1 ms | 4.8 ms | 214,847 |
| TCP | RFC 7766 | 53/tcp | clear text | 100% | 1.7 ms | 5.9 ms | 56,990 |
| DNS over TLS | RFC 7858 | 853/tcp | X25519-MLKEM768 | 100% | 10 ms | 44 ms | 6,503 |
| DNS over QUIC | RFC 9250 | 853, 443/udp | X25519-MLKEM768, SECP384R1-MLKEM1024 | 100% | 8.5 ms | 25 ms | 6,464 |
| DNS over HTTPS | RFC 8484 | 443/tcp, h2 + h3 | SECP384R1-MLKEM1024 | 100% | 13 ms | 60 ms | 11,503 |
Source: the health check (since 4 Nov 2026, 13:17 UTC, 2,016 runs; key exchange in the latest run), the servers' own counters (queries; DNS over HTTPS: requests) · 11 Nov 2026, 13:05 UTC
Response time by transport, per day
- UDP
- TCP
- DNS over TLS
- DNS over QUIC
- DNS over HTTPS
Per server
| Server | UDP | TCP | DNS over TLS | DNS over QUIC | DNS over HTTPS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ns1.pqcrypta.com | 0.3 ms | 0.5 ms | 12 ms | 8.2 ms | 13 ms |
| ns2.pqcrypta.com | 1.4 ms | 2.0 ms | 8.7 ms | 8.4 ms | 12 ms |
| ns3.pqcrypta.com | 1.2 ms | 2.0 ms | 9.9 ms | 8.6 ms | 15 ms |
| ns4.pqcrypta.com | 28 ms | 56 ms | 117 ms | 119 ms | 150 ms |
Median time to an answer, both addresses of each server together.
DNS over HTTPS and discovery
DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484) is served over HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 at
/dns-query, by GET and by POST, with answers
padded to a fixed block size and an HTTP cache lifetime taken from their TTLs.
Each server says which encrypted transports it serves in an SVCB record at
_dns.<its name> (RFC 9461), so a resolver can find them without probing:
_dns.ns1.pqcrypta.com. SVCB 1 ns1.pqcrypta.com. alpn=dot,doq,h2,h3 dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}
_dns.ns2.pqcrypta.com. SVCB 1 ns2.pqcrypta.com. alpn=dot,doq,h2,h3 dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}
_dns.ns3.pqcrypta.com. SVCB 1 ns3.pqcrypta.com. alpn=dot,doq,h2,h3 dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}
_dns.ns4.pqcrypta.com. SVCB 1 ns4.pqcrypta.com. alpn=dot,doq,h2,h3 dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}
Source: the health check (the records as the zones publish them) · 11 Nov 2026, 13:05 UTC
Post-quantum key exchange
Every encrypted transport negotiates a key exchange built on ML-KEM (FIPS 203), so a recording of the traffic cannot be decrypted later by a quantum computer. The group a client gets depends on what it offers: a client that offers ML-KEM on its own can get that, one that offers only the hybrids gets a hybrid, and a client that offers neither still gets an answer, over a classical key exchange. This is what the analyzer's client negotiated with each server.
| Server | Transport | TLS | Cipher | Key exchange (code point) | Certificate | By address |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ns1.pqcrypta.com | DNS over QUIC | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 66.179.95.51 |
| ns1.pqcrypta.com | DNS over TLS | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 66.179.95.51 |
| ns1.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h2) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 66.179.95.51 |
| ns1.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h3) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 66.179.95.51 |
| ns2.pqcrypta.com | DNS over QUIC | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 74.208.108.89 |
| ns2.pqcrypta.com | DNS over TLS | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 74.208.108.89 |
| ns2.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h2) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 74.208.108.89 |
| ns2.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h3) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 74.208.108.89 |
| ns3.pqcrypta.com | DNS over QUIC | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 209.46.123.222 |
| ns3.pqcrypta.com | DNS over TLS | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 209.46.123.222 |
| ns3.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h2) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 209.46.123.222 |
| ns3.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h3) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 209.46.123.222 |
| ns4.pqcrypta.com | DNS over QUIC | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 35.245.35.45 |
| ns4.pqcrypta.com | DNS over TLS | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11EC) | publicly trusted | names 35.245.35.45 |
| ns4.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h2) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 35.245.35.45 |
| ns4.pqcrypta.com | DNS over HTTPS (h3) | TLSv1.3 | TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
MLKEM1024 (0x0202) | publicly trusted | names 35.245.35.45 |
Source: the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer's latest scan of pqcrypta.com (scan it again) · 11 Nov 2026, 12:58 UTC
Standards conformance
The Post-Quantum Web Analyzer puts every name server it meets through its conformance checks, each citing the requirement it tests: up to 73 on a server that answers every transport, 33 of them on DNS over QUIC and 14 on DNS over HTTPS. Its catalogues map RFC 9250's 47 requirements and RFC 8484's 28 to the checks that cover them. These servers are where every check was tried first. Run the scan to see every check, its evidence and the requirement behind it.
| Server | Pass | Fail | RFC 9250 met | RFC 8484 met | Resolver compatibility | Privacy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ns1.pqcrypta.com | 63 | 0 | 27 of 27 tested | 13 of 13 tested | 100% | 100% |
| ns2.pqcrypta.com | 63 | 0 | 27 of 27 tested | 13 of 13 tested | 100% | 100% |
| ns3.pqcrypta.com | 63 | 0 | 27 of 27 tested | 13 of 13 tested | 100% | 100% |
| ns4.pqcrypta.com | 63 | 0 | 27 of 27 tested | 13 of 13 tested | 100% | 100% |
DNS over QUIC, and 0-RTT
A returning client can send its query in the first flight, before the handshake completes (0-RTT), which RFC 9250 section 4.5 allows for a query. These servers answer queries in 0-RTT, protect it against replay, and refuse anything that changes state sent that way.
| Server | Full handshake | Query on an open connection | 8 at once | 0-RTT |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ns1.pqcrypta.com | 19 ms p95 78 ms | 0.8 ms | 19 ms | 2.8 ms |
| ns2.pqcrypta.com | 40 ms p95 58 ms | 1.2 ms | 19 ms | 4.1 ms |
| ns3.pqcrypta.com | 26 ms p95 71 ms | 0.8 ms | 2.6 ms | 4.3 ms |
| ns4.pqcrypta.com | 34 ms p95 72 ms | 28 ms | 43 ms | 58 ms |
Medians from the scanner's vantage point (US East (Virginia)), so they include the network path to each server.
Source: the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer's latest scan of pqcrypta.com (scan it again) · 11 Nov 2026, 12:58 UTC
DNSSEC
Every zone is signed with ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256 (algorithm 13), the algorithm every validating resolver must support. Denial of existence is NSEC3 with no extra iterations and no salt, as RFC 9276 recommends: it does not hand out the zone's names. Signatures are valid for 30 days and renewed long before they expire; zone-signing keys roll every 90 days automatically, and each key-signing key's DS at the parent is confirmed by the signer itself. Every version of every zone also carries a ZONEMD digest (SHA384).
| Zone | Chain from the root | KSK | DS at the parent | ZSK, next roll | Serial | Last signed | Signatures valid |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| pqcrypta.com | secure | 29714 active | 29714 matches | 81, 17 Jan 2027 | 1794346321 all servers | 16 hours ago | 26.5 days |
| stlweb.dev | secure | 19036 active | 19036 matches | 28226, 17 Jan 2027 | 1794339781 all servers | 17 hours ago | 26.5 days |
| fated.org | secure | 48434 active | 48434 matches | 37007, 17 Jan 2027 | 1794339781 all servers | 17 hours ago | 26.5 days |
| philibertsecurity.com | secure | 40725 active | 40725 matches | 59614, 17 Jan 2027 | 1794339781 all servers | 17 hours ago | 26.5 days |
| pqpdf.com | secure | 17165 active | 17165 matches | 49742, 17 Jan 2027 | 1794339781 all servers | 17 hours ago | 26.5 days |
"Chain from the root": validated from the root's trust anchor through each parent's DS. "Signatures valid": the shortest time left on any SOA or DNSKEY signature any server serves.
Source: the health check (chains, DS, serials, signatures), the signer (keys and signing) · 11 Nov 2026, 13:05 UTC
Zone timers
| Timer | Value | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| refresh | 4 hours | 20 minutes to 12 hours (RFC 1912 section 2.2) |
| retry | 1 hour | a fraction of refresh (RFC 1912 section 2.2) |
| expire | 14 days | 2 to 4 weeks, longer than retry and minimum (RFC 1912 section 2.2) |
| minimum | 1 hour | the negative-caching TTL: 1 to 3 hours works well (RFC 2308 section 5) |
Source: the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer's latest scan of pqcrypta.com · 11 Nov 2026, 12:58 UTC
What they answer
The servers count what they answer, by transport, response code and query type, and the EDNS options and flags queries carry. Counts only: no name and no address is recorded.
- UDP
- TCP
- DNS over TLS
- DNS over QUIC
- DNS over HTTPS
Last 24 hours: 284,747 queries
| UDP | 214,847 | |
|---|---|---|
| TCP | 56,990 | |
| DNS over TLS | 6,503 | |
| DNS over QUIC | 6,464 | |
| DNS over HTTPS | 11,503 |
Query types
| SOA | 73,168 | |
|---|---|---|
| DNSKEY | 70,948 | |
| A | 62,613 | |
| AAAA | 43,606 | |
| HTTPS | 21,732 | |
| TXT | 3,929 | |
| NS | 3,778 | |
| MX | 2,144 |
Response codes
| NOERROR | 246,411 | |
|---|---|---|
| BADCOOKIE | 28,669 | |
| NXDOMAIN | 7,250 | |
| REFUSED | 2,015 | |
| BADVERS | 412 | |
| FORMERR | 29 | |
| NOTAUTH | 16 | |
| NOTIMPL | 2 |
EDNS options in queries
| COOKIE | 68,044 | |
|---|---|---|
| PADDING | 16,923 | |
| EDNS-CLIENT-SUBNET | 9,115 | |
| NSID | 857 | |
| other | 410 |
Flags in queries
| DO | 208,237 | |
|---|---|---|
| TC | 3,452 |
Last 7 days: 1,677,147 queries
| UDP | 1,302,159 | |
|---|---|---|
| TCP | 303,208 | |
| DNS over TLS | 36,086 | |
| DNS over QUIC | 35,931 | |
| DNS over HTTPS | 54,108 |
Query types
| DNSKEY | 403,361 | |
|---|---|---|
| A | 399,700 | |
| SOA | 395,758 | |
| AAAA | 288,272 | |
| HTTPS | 122,088 | |
| NS | 21,615 | |
| TXT | 21,248 | |
| MX | 11,425 |
Response codes
| NOERROR | 1,472,133 | |
|---|---|---|
| BADCOOKIE | 154,190 | |
| NXDOMAIN | 36,841 | |
| REFUSED | 11,802 | |
| BADVERS | 2,219 | |
| FORMERR | 165 | |
| NOTAUTH | 22 | |
| NOTIMPL | 12 |
EDNS options in queries
| COOKIE | 368,084 | |
|---|---|---|
| PADDING | 92,490 | |
| EDNS-CLIENT-SUBNET | 61,814 | |
| NSID | 4,770 | |
| other | 2,217 |
Flags in queries
| DO | 1,257,156 | |
|---|---|---|
| TC | 22,951 |
Source: the servers' own counters, and the requests to DNS over HTTPS (counting since 23 Oct 2026, 18:04 UTC) · 11 Nov 2026, 13:07 UTC
How it is watched
Every five minutes a health check asks every address over every transport from outside the servers' own networks, and requires a publicly trusted certificate for the server's name, one that verifies for the address too (as a client given the address rather than the name checks it), and a post-quantum key exchange on each encrypted one. It checks that every server serves the signer's serial and keys, that every signature has a safe margin left, that the answers validate through each server, and at each parent, where the zone is delegated and whether its DS matches. System Telemetry's DNS tab shows each run.
Source: the health check's history · 11 Nov 2026, 13:05 UTC
Among the name servers the scanner has measured
Every scan on the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer asks the scanned domain's name servers over the same transports. Leaving ours out, it has measured 1,510 name-server hosts: 25 answer DNS over TLS, 8 DNS over QUIC and 6 DNS over HTTPS (of 1,510 asked over it); 17 negotiated a post-quantum key exchange and 3 publish an RFC 9461 discovery record. Ours, 4 hosts: 4 DNS over TLS, 4 DNS over QUIC, 4 DNS over HTTPS, 4 post-quantum, 4 with a discovery record.
| Operator | Hosts | DoT | DoQ | DoH | Post-quantum | Discovery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| pqcrypta.com (ours) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| facebook.com | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| ipv64.net | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| instagram.com | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| whatsapp.net | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| m-online.net | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| wikimedia.org | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ojos.tv | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| quicojs.dev | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| fixt.co.il | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Operators whose name servers answer at least one encrypted transport, by the name servers' domain, from the scanner's vantage point.
Source: the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer's corpus, measured since 19 Oct 2026, 00:27 UTC
Ask them yourself
With kdig (version 3.3 or later for DNS over QUIC). Add +tls-ca to check the
certificate against the system's roots; kdig prints the key exchange it negotiated. Or
let the scanner ask them.
# DNS over QUIC
kdig @ns1.pqcrypta.com +quic +tls-ca fated.org SOA
# DNS over QUIC on the port HTTP/3 answers
kdig @ns1.pqcrypta.com -p 443 +quic +tls-ca fated.org SOA
# DNS over TLS
kdig @ns1.pqcrypta.com +tls +tls-ca fated.org SOA
# DNS over HTTPS (HTTP/2)
kdig @ns1.pqcrypta.com +https=/dns-query +tls-ca fated.org SOA
# By address: the certificate is checked against the address
kdig @66.179.95.51 +https=/dns-query +tls-ca fated.org SOA
# The server's discovery record (RFC 9461)
kdig @ns1.pqcrypta.com _dns.ns1.pqcrypta.com SVCB
# DNSSEC, validated
delv @ns1.pqcrypta.com fated.org SOA
# The zone digest
kdig @ns1.pqcrypta.com fated.org ZONEMD +dnssecFrequently asked questions
Why run our own authoritative name servers?
Two reasons. The zones carry HTTPS records with Encrypted Client Hello configurations whose post-quantum keys make them longer than a registrar's DNS would accept, and they rotate weekly, so the servers must take updates automatically. And the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer checks other people's name servers for DNS over QUIC, DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS with a post-quantum key exchange: ours are where every one of those checks is held to its standard first.
What do the zones' HTTPS records tell a browser before it connects?
Which protocols the site speaks (h3 and h2), its Encrypted Client Hello configuration, and, on pqcrypta.com's names, the key exchange groups its server takes, most preferred first (tls-supported-groups, draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction). With the groups, a client sends the key share the server will choose, an ML-KEM one, in its first ClientHello, rather than guessing and being asked to retry. They are measured from the server over TCP and QUIC at every publish, never typed in, and checked against it hourly; the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer holds any site's list to the groups and order it measures there. Every record also carries the addresses its name answers on (ipv4hint and ipv6hint), taken from the zone's own A and AAAA at every publish and checked against them on every health check, so a client can start connecting from the HTTPS answer alone, without waiting for the address lookups.
What is a hidden signer?
A DNS server that holds the zones and their DNSSEC private keys, signs every change, and answers nothing but zone transfers to the public servers. No resolver can reach it and it appears in no NS record, so the keys never sit on a machine that answers the Internet. The public servers hold only signed copies, verify each one before serving it, and refuse one that fails.
Is a DNSSEC signature post-quantum?
Not yet, anywhere: DNSSEC algorithms need an IANA number that every validating resolver implements, and no post-quantum signature algorithm has one. The zones are signed with the algorithm every validator must support. What is post-quantum here is the transport: DNS over TLS, QUIC and HTTPS, and the transfers between our servers, use an ML-KEM key exchange, so a recording of the traffic cannot be decrypted later by a quantum computer.
Why does a name server need post-quantum encryption at all?
Which names a resolver looks up reveals what its users are visiting, and an encrypted session recorded today can be decrypted once a large quantum computer exists. A key exchange built on ML-KEM (FIPS 203), alone or in a hybrid with a classical curve, keeps the session private.
Is 0-RTT safe for DNS?
For a query, yes: RFC 9250 allows a query in 0-RTT data, because a replayed query only repeats an answer. Anything that changes state must not be accepted that way. These servers answer queries in 0-RTT, protect it against replay, and refuse an update sent in early data with Extended DNS Error 26, Too Early.
Can I query these servers over DNS over QUIC myself?
Yes. The commands under "Ask them yourself" do it with kdig, which asks over DNS over QUIC from version 3.3, and over DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS. DNS over QUIC answers on UDP 853, and on 443 as well, for a network that passes UDP 443 and not 853. Any client can, too: the servers answer for their own zones only, to anyone, and refuse everything else.
How can I check my own name servers?
Scan your domain with the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer: it asks each of its name servers over DNS over QUIC, DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS, reports the key exchange each uses, and puts every server through the same conformance checks shown here for ours, RFC 9250's and RFC 8484's among them.