JA4 q13d0116h3_0f2cb44170f4_df815552bcbf

q13d0116h3_0f2cb44170f4_df815552bcbf

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

1

Extensions offered

16

ALPN

h3

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• q13d0316h3_55b375c5d22e_df815552bcbf

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 1

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Extensions 16

• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• status_request
• key_share
• server_name
• session_ticket
• renegotiation_info
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms_cert
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• quic_transport_parameters
• supported_versions
• supported_groups
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 2

• x25519
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4865,16-5-51-0-35-65281-23-13-11-50-45-57-43-10-18-41,29-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-09-01 05:48 UTC

Last seen

2026-09-01 05:48 UTC

Transport

QUIC

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.