q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_653d80c3fe9d
Headless Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0311h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
653d80c3fe9d
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 11
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 11
-
supported_groups -
17613 (0x44cd) -
encrypted_client_hello -
key_share -
quic_transport_parameters -
compress_certificate -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
signature_algorithms -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
supported_versions -
server_name
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867,10-17613-65037-51-57-27-16-13-45-43-0,4588-29-23-24,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 55
- First seen
- 2026-10-15 02:12 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-15 03:23 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 55
The same client, 55 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 55 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 55 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
331139f971760d4835d0db8205c7a1f1ab87da5893975026cca942b41397e9348c3ee81d6972b8f5c6de116b030a3c5795e60992104d6950fff1422cd4ac6e0edaf374f7a2e4777ee27b44557d44e11bce940208e445f57b6716a926d09f0f6432467542864b35ff868c25fdff67fa7d6eab0ecbd24ab37d995389e72d0ac994b7941c5de015439780435c173ea00f888c1f10d97220ac121848d4e1ded3a3bbffd0c2aba90cb5bbf0753a729e015022d27cc18433f122b75388ef74c94b7f41- … and 43 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/143.0.7499.4 Safari/537.36172×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/150.0.0.0 Safari/537.3625×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/155.0.0.021×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.