JA4 q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_06cda9e17597

q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_06cda9e17597

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 12

• application_settings
• server_name
• signature_algorithms
• compress_certificate
• encrypted_client_hello
• key_share
• supported_groups
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• supported_versions
• quic_transport_parameters
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 4

• X25519Kyber768Draft00
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4865-4866-4867,17513-0-13-27-65037-51-10-45-43-57-16-41,25497-29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-09-04 21:05 UTC

Last seen

2026-09-25 15:24 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• d52220cd211a7ba2a7de88755f370c80
• b37fea1b291ec2f8d7f15080574d5122

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/128.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 3×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; arm_64; Android 15; 2505DRP06G) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.6998.94 YaBrowser/25.4.5.94.01 Safari/537.36 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.