q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_16aff4c164e8
PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
16aff4c164e8
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
status_request -
quic_transport_parameters -
key_share -
ec_point_formats -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
extended_master_secret -
supported_versions -
session_ticket -
signature_algorithms -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
server_name -
supported_groups
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867,5-57-51-11-16-23-43-35-13-45-0-10,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 9822
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 01:10 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-27 12:18 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 8806
The same client, 8806 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 8806 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 8806 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
9822d35ef3997228ce8242d8aba65c9a58dd8b28ee61375bee69271a5594fd49114f028919868e871efa215f1dcceef9fecd1bdfd05ad668678d215e6d572ce89f30f7b833954b08dadf2f29946093e9d3bdbba3aef517cb2c66be6078fd23fc441db835dcba6ea05837239896bf065fa302666ae8e81068fa94c72aef4bc54af72619dce876f0086b49028bc3fda6ed854210125339d91c92816eac3dd7e4616793629b91f8ca29aafb13ee4635bf7e147eff6463ce14f5db5b538b24c57a7f- … and 8794 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.04433×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.