q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_1c2297567466
PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
1c2297567466
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
key_share -
signature_algorithms -
server_name -
supported_groups -
status_request -
supported_versions -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
ec_point_formats -
extended_master_secret -
quic_transport_parameters -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867,51-13-0-10-5-43-16-45-11-23-57-41,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 18
- First seen
- 2026-09-10 20:43 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-15 03:41 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 17
The same client, 17 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 17 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 17 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
a7ffc793d3c6c96a8f955310b691ef271887281a7a029fc7f096701ea3efd43591c9119ced4573ea63a3f4e3095d7248881838025900f098e94d63194f71702b36ceb0ee94b597198fbb0ffdd101b11a2059a9869bee10a8950ee6fe2f2065613c28d08f722f653f1912ac391af75b0e6a03ad44f8683e8e05d8d68198cea1369d2da2293843fdbf85ab0bdbea7ff666f8603de39182d637fb005d5f03a82ea2e9e7aacddbbd94642c15ace6faf561596bc2fd56a0a8e824340c839b47338d5a- … and 5 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.04×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.