JA4 q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_5a06198afb93

q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_5a06198afb93

Edge — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 12

• encrypted_client_hello
• server_name
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• compress_certificate
• 17613 (0x44cd)
• supported_groups
• key_share
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• quic_transport_parameters
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4865-4866-4867,65037-0-13-43-27-17613-10-51-16-45-57-41,4588-29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

14

First seen

2026-10-15 01:42 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-15 03:40 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

14

The same client, 14 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 14 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 14 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 1eb09bb8f7cdf04421a4f6f8e16cf505
• db06416c1926a800b7334dd5b8539c61
• d48086897cd10070404feb312a5e756c
• 41795956a618f372fbe4bc07b3a79c46
• f33ecf89331929144edab8d99c24e627
• 14c435227cf8f6ebe7ebe733f3b34295
• ca1ca500b811a5a6bbce22c992dc9439
• 308e87489ee30f213333054d4cc72d88
• 4855b58e9b4ab466741d4faa84a47723
• 8350cda4956c35c4a4a83f37a081972f
• ca99bf2e0f0c7c8321d5649b338e3c8d
• 94743c320888c069cd0272ca7b337cfa
• … and 2 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/153.0.0.0 632×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 3×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.