q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_7dc75dfa4f61
PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
7dc75dfa4f61
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
key_share -
supported_versions -
quic_transport_parameters -
extended_master_secret -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
signature_algorithms -
supported_groups -
status_request -
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867,16-51-43-57-23-45-13-10-5-0-11-41,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 3614
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 08:39 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-15 01:25 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 3396
The same client, 3396 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 3396 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3396 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
deb91a96775c0937e81994e750d4e1d039141acec579f7c848bdcb9906b012b6aa341ea0f9bf84b19d84eda0553b9938f3e9c2b354a967fc0c35e289ddf859126cf38924d6472f79a69346db1b17644682530d11fe437851f7e06c84ec487004739dd62375f13aeb5edfe2416b44c259154bb08b90354346dc17d5175b172735e563c3a42873c537006ae722a921f7603a88ec06478d29e0b437e74a5aa60c3c2308e97fa5ecb93c3aa81f92bca5d9addb897c6bcc26be4e36cb0d3e68d06aee- … and 3384 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.093×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.