JA4 q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_cfcfb9a788a6

q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_cfcfb9a788a6

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Extensions 12

• quic_transport_parameters
• supported_groups
• session_ticket
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• compress_certificate
• server_name
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation

Named groups 1

• 4590 (0x11ee)

771,4866-4867-4865,57-10-35-22-23-13-43-45-51-27-0-16,4590,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

8

First seen

2026-10-16 10:17 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-16 10:17 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

4

The same client, 4 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 4 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 4 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 2f98093ecbfdf1c5512eeb96b81f91df
• babb3b42f4f940bbf95d7325ed229838
• 83873cfdddbd351829d0f3520a0256e2
• 5cc2dcbcce732a027dc528cec7835b73

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.