q13d0313h3_55b375c5d22e_b0954bf1abdf
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0313h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
b0954bf1abdf
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 13
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 13
-
server_name -
encrypted_client_hello -
17613 (0x44cd) -
51764 (0xca34) -
signature_algorithms -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
supported_groups -
compress_certificate -
quic_transport_parameters -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
supported_versions -
key_share -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867,0-65037-17613-51764-13-45-10-27-57-16-43-51-41,4588-29-23-24,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 15
- First seen
- 2026-10-15 01:42 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-15 03:41 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 15
The same client, 15 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 15 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 15 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
4c41ca28cb3c8250f1e697577a35c57afafb12c6d54292f3abd91ecbdfdd36f4321c2d8d024d6b17eac14fcaee01a4e89de680f3d7b9cbe416ca5b782982636c91d1af4abe5d2ea2043cbfd9ae7d9119bc2657009b2f065f1154a2945bb0a252d3fe719dc4ededb0d8d4204eca6574cd04415ce29f12c67cb432fb96814f62fa6f7e45e9c0dc7253bcf206aa803fe76e4ef9828199de0b9d72c9e7a2b996ab0b86fb19522440ede1d615d75ffc23355b5f9fa48cd78f6e1ab736084562de6cf5- … and 3 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.36327×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.