q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_40246181ac92
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0314h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
40246181ac92
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 14
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 14
-
51764 (0xca34) -
encrypted_client_hello -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
4832 (0x12e0) -
quic_transport_parameters -
supported_groups -
signature_algorithms -
17613 (0x44cd) -
server_name -
compress_certificate -
key_share -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867,51764-65037-43-45-4832-57-10-13-17613-0-27-51-16-41,4588-29-23-24,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 13
- First seen
- 2026-10-15 04:29 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-15 05:49 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 13
The same client, 13 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 13 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 13 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
7fa53657a6306df4b93c8aa33c4487e2079633668538ee45b9ad70442ffd46d417e88dc3fde689e17ac5f9ee8691ee11eccf6189751cb2bd40eb17d09dfd8a231a291b48e884347a661b447fca7858f0c2d814e636768a3e726b7c2ee2b3c63522d2a79e84daabaa25d250fc912530c40873b0b902353b26cc787984856275f65d591a93acc8eb25ad8500e145afa022d11588be21492304d7cee58df11261867f3cd9c8d7d7f00af9ca74f5d24f4f80d37acab4d3020e0d17b40171fe5763b4- … and 1 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/158.0.0.0 Safari/537.36110×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.