JA4 q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_61e396c58b1f

q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_61e396c58b1f

Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

14

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 14

• server_name
• extended_master_secret
• renegotiation_info
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• status_request
• 34 (0x0022)
• key_share
• supported_versions
• signature_algorithms
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• record_size_limit
• quic_transport_parameters
• encrypted_client_hello

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

771,4865-4867-4866,0-23-65281-10-16-5-34-51-43-13-45-28-57-65037,29-23-24-25,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

147

First seen

2026-09-03 14:44 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-13 12:54 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

145

The same client, 145 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 145 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 145 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 7a8e625dea44f20fe8d8d657583506d1
• 276ca8c143c9f150876b55c1245db92c
• 950b36d0b637aea1f22db6f4d81893bf
• f42ebbd64056f6a0eb5a36ea81f3e34c
• 5d07ccaf6b678f2f68c788ddf9fbfea8
• 994ca184b487723af10c7742b3811552
• 418d5f65067bbf96650ba0378225f39f
• c76273692eded40c1fb20af10132c6b8
• 8c01441fa7eaa56643e913d071702d0a
• 89371e8392ae9d99e2c2c4e929880059
• 48b594d894ed24f9831d6524def51415
• df092b6a1f314e97bd3846a6d20fcefd
• … and 133 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0 3162×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0 23×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0 4×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.