JA4 q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_40246181ac92

q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_40246181ac92

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

14

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 14

• signature_algorithms
• server_name
• key_share
• 17613 (0x44cd)
• quic_transport_parameters
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• 51764 (0xca34)
• supported_versions
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• supported_groups
• compress_certificate
• 4832 (0x12e0)
• encrypted_client_hello
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4865-4866-4867,13-0-51-17613-57-45-51764-43-16-10-27-4832-65037-41,4588-29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

127

First seen

2026-09-07 20:04 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-22 15:40 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

127

The same client, 127 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 127 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 127 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 8e09629fdedc6e6a310f9ae94d673d1c
• c98d7eab094b29c85e256ac64ac3dba6
• c64fe7f1a1c3288de6494ecb0083b500
• 38359ef2682ad65dfe6dec3b83264c72
• 1dfe0fac6f5599bc50508d7b47b30e49
• ca243a5aeb22d2f34e0527a551004d69
• 89cf49b205bb30baa91082a27d7eb1bd
• 3c3970361218cb1f6ec426b16c38365c
• 5052a1333a5a3055cac8a7e53b22a02a
• f77e9e3c3f0c2564b294bd82853b4c2e
• c2d814e636768a3e726b7c2ee2b3c635
• 92ba961c3f3d27f5850011e2c2b71382
• … and 115 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/158.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 1015×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/157.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 395×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 269×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 66×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 21×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 15×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 3×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 3×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/142.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.