JA4 q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_7dbaeef5f02a

q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_7dbaeef5f02a

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

14

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 14

• encrypted_client_hello
• server_name
• supported_groups
• supported_versions
• quic_transport_parameters
• 51764 (0xca34)
• compress_certificate
• 17613 (0x44cd)
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• 4832 (0x12e0)
• signature_algorithms
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4865-4866-4867,65037-0-10-43-57-51764-27-17613-16-45-51-4832-13-41,4588-29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

11

First seen

2026-09-07 20:04 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-02 22:15 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

11

The same client, 11 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 11 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 11 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• d6545d96f3f443a924b0afb60901edb5
• 3b1ce8c435514a1053011925abe796c1
• ad282db31426f0f7bafb3f3a00f79cbf
• 2b741b5fc52cb2d3823c0ccda7e1303c
• c663f9a007d9b871fbfe199274f2935f
• f6d3c931e8614e9858709b843b98cef4
• 65e1683ac75288d08b840fa3f01d91cb
• b5dede9b5811efc4592be84d3b7c172a
• 5d0d20f646564014e75debf0db954d14
• 4222021a5fb88a22590dd16ab4c964b0
• 3a6d7bcf30b51b87943694b72822c25d

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 21×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 15×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 3×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 3×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.