JA4 q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_80a9d9df9501

q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_80a9d9df9501

Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

14

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 14

• encrypted_client_hello
• server_name
• supported_versions
• quic_transport_parameters
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• status_request
• compress_certificate
• signature_algorithms
• supported_groups
• record_size_limit
• key_share
• 34 (0x0022)
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 5

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

771,4865-4867-4866,65037-0-43-57-16-5-27-13-10-28-51-34-45-41,4588-29-23-24-25,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

11

First seen

2026-09-28 13:47 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-09 03:34 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

11

The same client, 11 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 11 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 11 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 0d0432a67eda9793a53b7042972faa80
• d0f3eb160d465d872a933bd27a4f1994
• 3ee19e68e98a26a0418d892c259c5988
• d5b385c70ef24a826bcdd329848a8b4f
• 5a430dfdd31d42c2af01b22dcabd9ccc
• 5f663475441c103e3c946bca249fe6db
• f80db168ebc9e12888fe9d91509ccfad
• 32ced76233b0f94eed4d0d3d765389ec
• ab53789cbee9ec976c2ba918233529d7
• 18a959ed1cbb2410dbd9078f0143deb2
• ef0e6fb3b2a1c96573c9bce55c8688cb

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:156.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/156.0 2077×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:156.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/156.0 614×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:156.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/156.0 294×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Android 13; Mobile; rv:156.0) Gecko/156.0 Firefox/156.0 15×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.