q13d0315h3_55b375c5d22e_bb76f32061e3
Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0315h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
bb76f32061e3
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 15
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Extensions 15
-
status_request -
signature_algorithms -
supported_groups -
supported_versions -
key_share -
server_name -
extended_master_secret -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
record_size_limit -
34 (0x0022) -
compress_certificate -
renegotiation_info -
quic_transport_parameters -
encrypted_client_hello
Named groups 5
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4867-4866,5-13-10-43-51-0-23-45-16-28-34-27-65281-57-65037,4588-29-23-24-25,
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 1658
- First seen
- 2026-09-04 21:22 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-11-08 18:01 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 980
The same client, 980 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 980 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 980 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
010ebc8912e3522f85c3a06ae701671f001c1b86c7cd46be7892ef94f2606618de48ec736fcf19e2f298b981eaf3ff0cb771a96b012b13cc9c4d6cbb2a39fe476ffd9f908e1ae1139d98b7da42b66725012a690a5eb854c6b45d03a34cbf16b002762556bec9a55ed58c60a818b39a8a02b4f7849d4885b3debbba1e0a23c27e02d7157248f6873099a93ee2f026966c03aaad01cb0c0ed82741b79d0159d26104b32de568a9ec572650bd2e39e09dca04d5efbda2baff9f83f8837ea18cd6ce- … and 968 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:156.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/156.014397×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:156.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/156.04079×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:156.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/156.02160×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:156.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/156.01131×Mozilla/5.0 (Android 16; Mobile; rv:156.0) Gecko/156.0 Firefox/156.0236×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:158.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/158.0222×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:157.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/157.0140×Mozilla/5.0 (Android 13; Mobile; rv:156.0) Gecko/156.0 Firefox/156.026×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:155.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/155.08×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.