JA4 q13d0315h3_55b375c5d22e_c935d23fa9a4

q13d0315h3_55b375c5d22e_c935d23fa9a4

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

15

ALPN

h3

Same tool, different options

These 3 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• q13d0115h3_0f2cb44170f4_c935d23fa9a4
• q13d0215h3_62ed6f6ca7ad_c935d23fa9a4
• q13d0215h3_fffbd61365f3_c935d23fa9a4

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 15

• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• session_ticket
• renegotiation_info
• extended_master_secret
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• quic_transport_parameters
• status_request
• supported_groups
• signature_algorithms
• signature_algorithms_cert
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• supported_versions
• key_share
• psk_key_exchange_modes

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4865-4866-4867,0-11-35-65281-23-18-57-5-10-13-50-16-43-51-45,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

6

First seen

2026-09-10 21:16 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-05 11:04 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

4

The same client, 4 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 4 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 4 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• ab76c5da7688915188a5547503fae3a4
• 07b61405e69e6fe08ae2722d1eaa7c43
• 2026c5ee1b361ad2ae5536798534fe38
• 8cb56fbe608a7f5a9f6907c97e703460

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.