JA4 q13i0306h3_55b375c5d22e_1cecd519fee8

q13i0306h3_55b375c5d22e_1cecd519fee8

Shares its JA4_c (1cecd519fee8) with 1 fingerprint classified as browser, and nothing else in that family disagrees — the same tool under different cipher options. Inferred from the family, not observed directly.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

6

ALPN

h3

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• q13d0307h3_55b375c5d22e_1cecd519fee8

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 6

• key_share
• supported_versions
• signature_algorithms
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• quic_transport_parameters

Named groups 4

• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• x25519
• x448

771,4866-4865-4867,51-43-13-10-16-57,23-24-29-30,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

4

First seen

2026-10-25 10:33 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-25 10:35 UTC

Transport

QUIC

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.