JA4 q13i0311h3_55b375c5d22e_178839b6cec1

q13i0311h3_55b375c5d22e_178839b6cec1

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

h3

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_178839b6cec1

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 11

• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• signature_algorithms
• supported_groups
• 51764 (0xca34)
• key_share
• supported_versions
• 17613 (0x44cd)
• encrypted_client_hello
• compress_certificate
• quic_transport_parameters
• psk_key_exchange_modes

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4867-4865-4866,16-13-10-51764-51-43-17613-65037-27-57-45,4588-29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-10-27 03:23 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-27 03:35 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 3e36be20264bd4464ae5b3f05e2a9c44
• 130494d14fbbdca343bd6c76acc74eed

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 1×
• RootEvidence/1.0 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.