JA4 t10d100600_0fa29e80c1bb_b5c89f4acd37

t10d100600_0fa29e80c1bb_b5c89f4acd37

Legacy TLS client — inferred from the JA4 handshake shape.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.0

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

10

Extensions offered

6

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t11d100600_0fa29e80c1bb_b5c89f4acd37

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.0

Cipher suites 10

• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• 56 (0x0038)
• 50 (0x0032)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• 19 (0x0013)

Extensions 6

• renegotiation_info
• server_name
• status_request
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• session_ticket

Named groups 2

• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

769,49172-49171-53-47-49162-49161-56-50-10-19,65281-0-5-10-11-35,23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-10-29 06:30 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-29 06:30 UTC

Transport

TCP

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.