t12d280400_860185aaa100_c54f48fd7c65
Shares its JA4_c (c54f48fd7c65) with 14 fingerprints classified as scanner, and nothing else in that family disagrees — the same tool under different cipher options. Inferred from the family, not observed directly.
What this fingerprint encodes
t12d280400
handshake shape, human-readable
860185aaa100
truncated hash of the cipher list
c54f48fd7c65
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.2
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 28
- Extensions offered
- 4
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 20 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
- t12d040400_058957366436_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d600400_68200713fd55_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d600400_6f32ba44e122_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d600400_891918f05457_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d600400_bea8ef14a674_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d600400_f78222e0ad5a_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d600400_fd5e89c4ed05_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d640400_1715b94e3896_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d640400_1e98fdfb27e9_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d640400_a3acda31d846_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d640400_e31a90cd0803_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d640400_e7b476f9520b_c54f48fd7c65
- t12d640400_f559eb9565fd_c54f48fd7c65
- t12i040300_058957366436_c54f48fd7c65
- t12i640300_1715b94e3896_c54f48fd7c65
- t12i640300_1e98fdfb27e9_c54f48fd7c65
- t12i640300_a3acda31d846_c54f48fd7c65
- t12i640300_e31a90cd0803_c54f48fd7c65
- t12i640300_e7b476f9520b_c54f48fd7c65
- t12i640300_f559eb9565fd_c54f48fd7c65
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 28
-
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
49212 (0xc03c) -
49232 (0xc050) -
49213 (0xc03d) -
49233 (0xc051) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -
49274 (0xc07a) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -
49275 (0xc07b) -
9 (0x0009) -
7 (0x0007) -
1 (0x0001) -
2 (0x0002) -
59 (0x003b) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA -
49180 (0xc01c) -
49183 (0xc01f) -
49186 (0xc022) -
49179 (0xc01b) -
49182 (0xc01e) -
49185 (0xc021) -
49178 (0xc01a) -
49181 (0xc01d) -
49184 (0xc020)
Extensions 4
-
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
server_name -
signature_algorithms
Named groups 5
-
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1 -
x25519 -
ffdhe2048
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,157-49212-49232-49213-49233-65-186-49274-132-192-49275-9-7-1-2-59-4-5-150-49180-49183-49186-49179-49182-49185-49178-49181-49184,10-11-0-13,23-24-25-29-256,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 5
- First seen
- 2026-10-03 09:37 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-24 09:41 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 3
The same client, 3 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 3 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
4f26140a19d9d8289d7c5a91e8daded7535edc51342f35633875ad195fbc03571348213caf5495b0aebd99c1733a005c
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.