t12d330600_0dc27a1e2e1d_534fb25b08d4
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t12d330600
handshake shape, human-readable
0dc27a1e2e1d
truncated hash of the cipher list
534fb25b08d4
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.2
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 33
- Extensions offered
- 6
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 33
-
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 -
21 (0x0015) -
9 (0x0009)
Extensions 6
-
server_name -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
status_request -
renegotiation_info -
signature_algorithms
Named groups 2
-
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,52392-52393-52394-49171-51-47-49172-57-53-49191-103-60-107-61-49192-49199-158-156-49200-159-157-49161-49187-49162-49188-49170-22-10-49169-5-4-21-9,0-10-11-5-65281-13,23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 23
- First seen
- 2026-09-11 20:43 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-29 04:41 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.