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⟨ QUANTUM ERROR PORTAL ⟩

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JA4 t12i070700_be10c564b140_ac0d2f4ec206

Scanner — observed in live traffic

Scanner

t12i070700_be10c564b140_ac0d2f4ec206

Probe (no SNI, no ALPN) — inferred from the JA4 handshake shape.

What this fingerprint encodes

JA4_a t12i070700 handshake shape, human-readable
JA4_b be10c564b140 truncated hash of the cipher list
JA4_c ac0d2f4ec206 truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
Transport
TCP
TLS version
TLS 1.2
Server name
no server name (IP literal)
Cipher suites offered
7
Extensions offered
7
ALPN
none offered

Same tool, different options

These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version
TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 7

Extensions 7

Named groups 4

Point formats 1

Raw JA3 string
771,49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49326,5-10-11-13-65281-18-43,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections
1
First seen
2026-09-27 16:39 UTC
Last seen
2026-09-27 16:39 UTC
Transport
TCP

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.