t12i080300_30ad22c17fce_15cf763851c4
Probe (no SNI, no ALPN) — inferred from the JA4 handshake shape.
What this fingerprint encodes
t12i080300
handshake shape, human-readable
30ad22c17fce
truncated hash of the cipher list
15cf763851c4
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.2
- Server name
- no server name (IP literal)
- Cipher suites offered
- 8
- Extensions offered
- 3
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 8
-
20 (0x0014) -
17 (0x0011) -
25 (0x0019) -
8 (0x0008) -
6 (0x0006) -
23 (0x0017) -
3 (0x0003) -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 3
-
session_ticket -
signature_algorithms -
heartbeat
Raw JA3 string
771,20-17-25-8-6-23-3-255,35-13-15,,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 1
- First seen
- 2026-09-06 08:57 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-06 08:57 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.