JA4 t13d010500_c7f4f146491d_7d2e3258e2b0

t13d010500_c7f4f146491d_7d2e3258e2b0

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

1

Extensions offered

5

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 4 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d010500_0f2cb44170f4_7d2e3258e2b0
• t13d010500_58070c528ac8_7d2e3258e2b0
• t13d010500_8ecb5bcd8cd8_7d2e3258e2b0
• t13d010500_ee47968ec53b_7d2e3258e2b0

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 1

• TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256

Extensions 5

• server_name
• supported_versions
• supported_groups
• key_share
• signature_algorithms

Named groups 3

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4869,0-43-10-51-13,29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-10-23 06:51 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-23 06:51 UTC

Transport

TCP

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.