JA4 t13d010800_ee47968ec53b_8544085ae0aa

t13d010800_ee47968ec53b_8544085ae0aa

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

1

Extensions offered

8

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 1

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 8

• server_name
• supported_groups
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share

Named groups 3

• 514 (0x0202)
• 513 (0x0201)
• SecP384r1MLKEM1024

771,4866,0-10-22-23-13-43-45-51,514-513-512,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

5

First seen

2026-10-25 20:44 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-25 21:32 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 9ebac881788ced651626d5030ecef506
• 6efde80c89c777db052607de061faab5

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.