JA4 t13d0213h2_fffbd61365f3_91e936097c5b

t13d0213h2_fffbd61365f3_91e936097c5b

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

2

Extensions offered

13

ALPN

h2

Same tool, different options

These 4 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d9913h2_20184d8b7b6a_91e936097c5b
• t13d9913h2_3244f97f5040_91e936097c5b
• t13d9913h2_af593f9e21e7_91e936097c5b
• t13d9913h2_f00dd82459a6_91e936097c5b

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 2

• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 13

• renegotiation_info
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• status_request
• server_name
• extended_master_secret
• session_ticket
• signature_algorithms
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• supported_versions
• key_share
• psk_key_exchange_modes

Named groups 36

• 6 (0x0006)
• 9 (0x0009)
• secp521r1
• ffdhe3072
• 10 (0x000a)
• 19 (0x0013)
• 17 (0x0011)
• 22 (0x0016)
• 20 (0x0014)
• secp256r1
• 21 (0x0015)
• 11 (0x000b)
• 14 (0x000e)
• x448
• 18 (0x0012)
• 28 (0x001c)
• 26 (0x001a)
• 5 (0x0005)
• 0 (0x0000)
• 13 (0x000d)
• ffdhe4096
• ffdhe2048
• 7 (0x0007)
• 27 (0x001b)
• secp384r1
• 8 (0x0008)
• 2 (0x0002)
• 15 (0x000f)
• 3 (0x0003)
• 260 (0x0104)
• 4 (0x0004)
• 1 (0x0001)
• 12 (0x000c)
• 16 (0x0010)
• x25519
• 259 (0x0103)

Point formats 3

• uncompressed
• ansiX962_compressed_prime
• ansiX962_compressed_char2

771,4867-4866,65281-18-5-0-23-35-13-11-10-16-43-51-45,6-9-25-257-10-19-17-22-20-23-21-11-14-30-18-28-26-5-0-13-258-256-7-27-24-8-2-15-3-260-4-1-12-16-29-259,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections

4

First seen

2026-10-21 01:14 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-21 01:14 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• bb0606053495d24a07d9a55f59a01741
• 0e6cda33850ac797e41f225ca37667b0

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.