JA4 t13d030500_55b375c5d22e_a521478438ec

t13d030500_55b375c5d22e_a521478438ec

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

5

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 5

• server_name
• supported_versions
• supported_groups
• key_share
• signature_algorithms

Named groups 1

• 515 (0x0203)

771,4865-4866-4867,0-43-10-51-13,515,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

7

First seen

2026-10-16 04:09 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-16 04:09 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

7

The same client, 7 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 7 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 7 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• c5f13ec7f499b2f47900ec10f7c7e739
• 6e6e3625d09d71a2a3fc6c67b4bdbe26
• 3778c6fd10c1d69c60336be42aee397e
• 4165d7f13dc08a67e7765b8cbc6f0106
• 6f5572438119b82ed36fe1e064192eac
• 8d16912835b47a04c418f0d17a6e8d78
• cd943beef1a19304b2178e05a0fff83c

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.