t13d031100_55b375c5d22e_199193a2bd39
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d031100
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
199193a2bd39
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 11
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 3 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
- t13d011100_0f2cb44170f4_199193a2bd39
- t13d011100_58070c528ac8_199193a2bd39
- t13d011100_ee47968ec53b_199193a2bd39
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Extensions 11
-
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
session_ticket -
encrypt_then_mac -
extended_master_secret -
signature_algorithms -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share -
compress_certificate
Named groups 8
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
x448 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1 -
ffdhe2048 -
ffdhe3072
Point formats 3
-
uncompressed -
ansiX962_compressed_prime -
ansiX962_compressed_char2
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4867-4865,0-11-10-35-22-23-13-43-45-51-27,4588-29-23-30-24-25-256-257,0-1-2
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 119
- First seen
- 2026-09-04 12:35 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-06 20:14 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 5
The same client, 5 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 5 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 5 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
7c5d0596cedb9c086e8bebef099e73dc4e2c06ee8efc88ac876ccc99282311df55c573e924485d33041ae400987255f33d622dc951bc68a4653b5ae99e6e2dda3d279aaddb78527e9210e5d9282bc229
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.