JA4 t13d060600_a150a9413979_e48609b995f8

t13d060600_a150a9413979_e48609b995f8

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

6

Extensions offered

6

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d040600_f03b13587ee1_e48609b995f8
• t13d050600_75d938f10e26_e48609b995f8

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 6

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 6

• server_name
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• key_share

Named groups 17

• 9 (0x0009)
• 10 (0x000a)
• 11 (0x000b)
• 12 (0x000c)
• 13 (0x000d)
• 14 (0x000e)
• 22 (0x0016)
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1
• x25519
• x448
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072
• ffdhe4096
• 259 (0x0103)
• 260 (0x0104)

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4865-4866-4868-4869-4867-255,0-10-11-13-43-51,9-10-11-12-13-14-22-23-24-25-29-30-256-257-258-259-260,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

301

First seen

2026-08-23 18:30 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-16 02:50 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

7

The same client, 7 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 7 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 7 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 877398420ef17eb88990074c65f5b91c
• 723f132a5f8e4df6d3b3cffc6a0adb8c
• 54faf2f91fbbb069efec488ae341918e
• bcd23381143ed2c32b8c7f3440a641e5
• e4a661c9fe798444d17fe2ed9cab5bc6
• e0220173ba3963ffdf8c431475de3b63
• 8f3c738aa1836e9ff9de4caba6e91924

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.