t13d091000_f91f431d341e_c8ddf72c3365
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d091000
handshake shape, human-readable
f91f431d341e
truncated hash of the cipher list
c8ddf72c3365
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 9
- Extensions offered
- 10
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 9
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 10
-
supported_versions -
supported_groups -
key_share -
extended_master_secret -
signature_algorithms -
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
status_request -
encrypted_client_hello
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-49199-52392,43-10-51-23-13-0-11-45-5-65037,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 3
- First seen
- 2026-10-16 00:36 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-16 01:14 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 3
The same client, 3 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 3 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
b240d283ff5e173140029e06e13797a5eb2ff3c5bbe07ceb4091371f3f85fc24523cc8a620ef8bf8cac8dc1ff7a22372
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.