t13d0912h2_f91f431d341e_ef7df7f74e48
Claude-User — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d0912h2
handshake shape, human-readable
f91f431d341e
truncated hash of the cipher list
ef7df7f74e48
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 9
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h2
Same tool, different options
These 5 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
- t13d181100_5d04281c6031_ef7df7f74e48
- t13d1412h1_3241d5e7d676_ef7df7f74e48
- t13d1712h2_5b57614c22b0_ef7df7f74e48
- t13d1812h1_5d04281c6031_ef7df7f74e48
- t13d1812ht_5d04281c6031_ef7df7f74e48
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 9
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Extensions 12
-
server_name -
extended_master_secret -
renegotiation_info -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
session_ticket -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
signature_algorithms -
key_share -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
supported_versions -
padding
Named groups 4
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-52393-49199-52392-49196-49200,0-23-65281-10-11-35-16-13-51-45-43-21,29-23-24-25,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 3
- First seen
- 2026-09-23 04:13 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-01 08:08 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; YearAlertLeadFinder/1.0; +https://yearalert.com/bot)2×Claude-User (claude-code/2.1.286; +https://support.anthropic.com/)2×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.