t13d1011h1_61a7ad8aa9b6_0d308c48d2a3
Shares its JA4_c (0d308c48d2a3) with 2 fingerprints classified as browser, and nothing else in that family disagrees — the same tool under different cipher options. Inferred from the family, not observed directly.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1011h1
handshake shape, human-readable
61a7ad8aa9b6
truncated hash of the cipher list
0d308c48d2a3
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 10
- Extensions offered
- 11
- ALPN
- h1
Same tool, different options
These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 10
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 11
-
supported_groups -
extended_master_secret -
signature_algorithms -
supported_versions -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
session_ticket -
server_name -
key_share -
ec_point_formats -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
status_request
Named groups 4
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
SecP256r1MLKEM768
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-49199-52392-255,10-23-13-43-16-35-0-51-11-45-5,29-23-24-4588,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 20
- First seen
- 2026-10-08 17:12 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-09 03:59 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 20
The same client, 20 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 20 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 20 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
912379672562ad9be14ab1e1eb58caf263728f84fec99400d33dc3e4dda687b137f3a98d0abf4eb97b2ffefd8223c15a9750f0de953db1a84e789f6de1fef2fb30f097711c763e3d87eb4bb06bd8b8d0d832c1b2878444975d73fd9ff827ba050dd7b153c9aed2bdc902b717868af0712930ccda59f70a8675dedfc5456e7f26b7f5b2ec04a21e4696586b865e8300acde23d10b40c12484bfe44c63854753972cebec6b5b4b1d4b344716919b251e4dd097c6d0b14d8a43715c87a622a33444- … and 8 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
SonarPrime RedirectMap/1.020×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.