JA4 t13d1011h2_61a7ad8aa9b6_053248755fe4

t13d1011h2_61a7ad8aa9b6_053248755fe4

PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

10

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

h2

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d1011h1_61a7ad8aa9b6_053248755fe4

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 10

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 11

• status_request
• ec_point_formats
• extended_master_secret
• supported_groups
• server_name
• signature_algorithms
• key_share
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-49199-52392-255,5-11-23-10-0-13-51-43-45-16-41,4588-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

14

First seen

2026-10-26 11:17 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-26 11:19 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

14

The same client, 14 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 14 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 14 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 5453fe7c729fc460bc7560446bc8f87a
• ae5c0722610ec43a68907436cc0e9c5c
• 3aab09f7319cf5cfe9ad6c29664f1fa7
• 46c838bdcd442f11079b8b03f680f425
• 44c869cb7ce4e275a5612976edfd8e10
• 09ca5899d013ed4b520ec5eb311b05a1
• a881018b20ce75c511c1b0a39eccd34f
• cde491e05fc5a81330f9949f1c6e0a5b
• 3b8ca5c52bc8c6d779b4123103262751
• 7512841157ca7185b2d00854ebb9c8ee
• f6b219de701fb8469f4afdc67130ae48
• 7344ee3807bff252f02650e003d44220
• … and 2 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.0 14×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.