t13d121000_a538d02d76d5_1f22a2ca17c4
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d121000
handshake shape, human-readable
a538d02d76d5
truncated hash of the cipher list
1f22a2ca17c4
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 12
- Extensions offered
- 10
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 13 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
- t13d1011h2_61a7ad8aa9b6_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d1611h1_1711a4c0508c_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d181000_85036bcba153_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d311000_e8f1e7e78f70_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d431000_c7886603b240_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d591000_a33745022dd6_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d5911h1_a33745022dd6_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d5911ht_a33745022dd6_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13i180900_85036bcba153_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13i430900_c7886603b240_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13i310900_e8f1e7e78f70_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13d5911h2_a33745022dd6_1f22a2ca17c4
- t13i5910h1_a33745022dd6_1f22a2ca17c4
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 12
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 10
-
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
session_ticket -
encrypt_then_mac -
extended_master_secret -
signature_algorithms -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share
Named groups 5
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
x448 -
secp521r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 3
-
uncompressed -
ansiX962_compressed_prime -
ansiX962_compressed_char2
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49195-49200-49199-49188-49187-49192-49191-255,0-11-10-35-22-23-13-43-45-51,29-23-30-25-24,0-1-2
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 1
- First seen
- 2026-11-21 22:02 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-11-21 22:02 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.