t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_7fbc130a98c0
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1515h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
7fbc130a98c0
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 15
- ALPN
- h2
Same tool, different options
These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 15
-
ec_point_formats -
signature_algorithms -
server_name -
renegotiation_info -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
encrypted_client_hello -
supported_versions -
session_ticket -
compress_certificate -
17613 (0x44cd) -
status_request -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
supported_groups -
key_share
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,11-13-0-65281-45-65037-43-35-27-17613-5-18-16-10-51,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 17
- First seen
- 2026-09-07 12:34 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-06 13:44 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 17
The same client, 17 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 17 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 17 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
20335a3a7a5558e0e18eff0ec3df0a3ed08ae359551651570c5b9690f9d28f93c2292a1ab34269dbb5166240e332eebd41fdc6bef096f5d7f83cb72464624c8ec0cc39e9862cdac6a5ca450ad2ea6a9753a1b3b77e9fcdc2a4521cb03ed6e2d33c3416ec0042c43a5af3b80b7f124f83acba52823ff455b8573fbf7ffbffb1f906a53ca0f87d360fc328ff243dcd646d20f5b177356403dd1e69b3cf75fd6fdda1f62919f1a1f8d98daf43ae91605b27a7c684c207e69ed6cb5b5b1fb433c3c0- … and 5 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.0.0 Safari/537.3630×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/146.0.7680.165 Safari/537.363×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/135.0.0.0 Safari/537.363×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile Safari/537.36 (compatible; Bytespider; spider-feedback@bytedance.com)1×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile Safari/537.36 (compatible; TikTokSpider; ttspider-feedback@tiktok.com)1×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/137.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 18_6 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/150.0.0.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.11×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.