JA4 t13d1609h1_1711a4c0508c_9f51f45c68af

t13d1609h1_1711a4c0508c_9f51f45c68af

Edge — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

16

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

h1

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 16

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 9

• supported_versions
• status_request
• session_ticket
• supported_groups
• key_share
• signature_algorithms
• ec_point_formats
• server_name
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53-255,43-5-35-10-51-13-11-0-16,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

44

First seen

2026-10-15 15:43 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-15 15:43 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

44

The same client, 44 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 44 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 44 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 9bdcdfeb148a319ed512c5a0c86dddd4
• 7abe6ec2dbfa8ad092a7376e75cd4e4a
• 0065a98099ae51f4f9e889d852a1d491
• 687564175d2626f07ca036f330b713eb
• 516820c7ab2afea94a7ce46ab6d36c2c
• 9ae28728dbf9a060946ea78a47c240cb
• b17cec16194938ad838f0753d035e1ff
• cc902a99009ce3ff80ced5639c48eb53
• 1c30c4af01115c255ada63390ebcaddf
• 027e3f1d0caa87a5f67a49bb571e7f0e
• 07a1cd62c19787c2a49cb30e776baf86
• 50ff9ab190d3d1121dcdd447c6f64ccb
• … and 32 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/155.0.0.0 195×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.