JA4 t13d190900_9dc949149365_a38838ecc1fa

t13d190900_9dc949149365_a38838ecc1fa

Baiduspider — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

19

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 19

• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 9

• server_name
• status_request
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• renegotiation_info
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• supported_versions
• key_share

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49161-49171-49162-49172-156-157-47-53-49170-10-4865-4866-4867,0-5-10-11-13-65281-18-43-51,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

55

First seen

2026-08-23 00:37 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-25 23:01 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

3

The same client, 3 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 3 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 473cd7cb9faa642487833865d516e578
• 1f24dbdea9cbd448a034e5d87c14168f
• df669e7ea913f1ac0c0cce9a201a2ec1

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider-render/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html) 19×
• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CensysInspect/1.1; +https://about.censys.io/) 16×
• visionheight.com/scan Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) Chrome/126.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 4×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/75.0.3770.145 Safari/537.36 Vivaldi/2.6.1566.49 1×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 1.5; fr-fr; GT-I5700 Build/CUPCAKE) AppleWebKit/528.5 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/3.1.2 Mobile Safari/525.20.1 1×
• Go-http-client/1.1 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.