JA4 t13d260900_3309cf098094_a38838ecc1fa

t13d260900_3309cf098094_a38838ecc1fa

Shares its JA4_c (a38838ecc1fa) with 1 fingerprint classified as api_client, and nothing else in that family disagrees — the same tool under different cipher options. Inferred from the family, not observed directly.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

26

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d190900_9dc949149365_a38838ecc1fa
• t13d250900_b78ed14e2fd0_a38838ecc1fa

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 26

• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 9

• server_name
• status_request
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• renegotiation_info
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• supported_versions
• key_share

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,52392-52393-49199-49200-49195-49196-49161-158-52392-52394-51-61-22-49162-57-49171-10-49172-156-157-47-53-49170-4867-4865-4866,0-5-10-11-13-65281-18-43-51,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-08-29 09:31 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-29 09:31 UTC

Transport

TCP

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.