t13d2710h2_991e33d7eb74_430968658c50
Presented a User-Agent we cannot attribute to a known client.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d2710h2
handshake shape, human-readable
991e33d7eb74
truncated hash of the cipher list
430968658c50
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 27
- Extensions offered
- 10
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 27
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (draft) -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (draft) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (draft)
Extensions 10
-
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share -
supported_versions -
signature_algorithms -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
encrypt_then_mac -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
server_name -
extended_master_secret
Named groups 9
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
4589 (0x11ed) -
X25519MLKEM768 -
secp521r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp256r1 -
x25519 -
21 (0x0015) -
ffdhe2048
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-49200-49199-159-158-52393-52392-52394-49191-49187-49192-49188-49162-49161-49172-49171-107-103-57-51-52244-52243-52245,45-51-43-13-11-10-22-16-0-23,4588-4589-4587-25-24-23-29-21-256,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 1
- First seen
- 2026-11-05 13:09 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-11-05 13:09 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
znetwork/8.22.01×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.