t13d301100_1d37bd780c83_c5490cc61429
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d301100
handshake shape, human-readable
1d37bd780c83
truncated hash of the cipher list
c5490cc61429
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 30
- Extensions offered
- 11
- ALPN
- none offered
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 30
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Extensions 11
-
renegotiation_info -
supported_groups -
session_ticket -
encrypt_then_mac -
extended_master_secret -
signature_algorithms -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share -
compress_certificate -
server_name
Named groups 1
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49200-159-52393-52392-52394-49195-49199-158-49188-49192-107-49187-49191-103-49162-49172-57-49161-49171-51-157-156-61-60-53-47,65281-10-35-22-23-13-43-45-51-27-0,4588,
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 8
- First seen
- 2026-10-16 10:17 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-16 10:17 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 8
The same client, 8 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 8 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 8 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
8d0248cfc8ee8cd16bdfd2419676ea81cfe515a15525b7400a98434dd622a81fa90747e15abd5b083b145af2a0339c8be49a29936cd34dd9c9efccf868861d96d841a0e47903df07d088d2edab8f7fe4cee617c79cb2b52fc1c5e2d49fc07b7987f61428a6bab21ca1089d41ce573e7848adfda2e5fb455cd062ebc40d7d2d35
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.