JA4 t13d350700_98f6b5ae8975_e74d7d97755c

t13d350700_98f6b5ae8975_e74d7d97755c

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

35

Extensions offered

7

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 35

• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 7

• server_name
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• extended_master_secret
• supported_versions
• key_share

Named groups 6

• secp256r1
• x25519
• secp384r1
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072
• ffdhe4096

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,49199-49171-49191-49200-49172-49192-156-47-60-157-53-61-65-132-49195-49324-49326-49161-49187-49196-49325-49327-49162-49188-158-51-103-159-57-107-69-136-4865-4866-255,0-10-11-13-23-43-51,23-29-24-256-257-258,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

37

First seen

2026-10-16 01:22 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-16 03:08 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 220×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.