JA4 t13d430900_c7886603b240_c9e58cc61e36

t13d430900_c7886603b240_c9e58cc61e36

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

43

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 43

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 9

• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share

Named groups 10

• x25519
• secp256r1
• x448
• secp521r1
• secp384r1
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072
• ffdhe4096
• 259 (0x0103)
• 260 (0x0104)

Point formats 3

• uncompressed
• ansiX962_compressed_prime
• ansiX962_compressed_char2

771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49200-49195-49199-52393-52392-159-158-52394-49327-49325-49188-49192-49162-49172-49315-49311-107-57-49326-49324-49187-49191-49161-49171-49314-49310-103-51-157-156-49313-49309-49312-49308-61-60-53-47-255,0-11-10-22-23-13-43-45-51,29-23-30-25-24-256-257-258-259-260,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections

28

First seen

2026-08-25 12:11 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-25 12:25 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.90 Safari/537.36 28×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.