JA4 t13i100900_61a7ad8aa9b6_cb8fff09048f

t13i100900_61a7ad8aa9b6_cb8fff09048f

Probe (no SNI, no ALPN) — inferred from the JA4 handshake shape.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

10

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 10

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 9

• supported_groups
• status_request
• ec_point_formats
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• signature_algorithms
• extended_master_secret
• session_ticket
• key_share

Named groups 3

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-49199-52392-255,10-5-11-43-45-13-23-35-51,29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

8

First seen

2026-09-07 14:55 UTC

Last seen

2026-09-24 23:29 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

8

The same client, 8 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 8 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 8 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 23a8eab24c3aa0d4192ac61a915cb183
• bf5390248884b355591704f59438045e
• 0cfb752f2170450e826f929b18e7b09b
• 24544fd2fc619c0b9455794ac5c7f1ad
• 831acf3093c90da33dcde8a7863d8ea7
• 0e830fbe30d26efe5271acd5347a5101
• 442470ce01e218f4ac1e9ae08cf0433f
• 8c5c24dffd3f008618730f4ceac5a245

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; FlowIQ/1.0; +https://flowiq-labs.com/scanning-info) 8×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.